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FOREWORD
The appeasement of Nazi Germany by the western democracies
during the 1930s and the subsequent outbreak of World War II have
been a major referent experience for U.S. foreign policymakers since
1945. From Harry Truman’s response to the outbreak of the Korean
War to George W. Bush’s decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein,
American presidents have repeatedly afﬁrmed the “lesson” of Munich
and invoked it to justify actual or threatened uses of force. However,
the conclusion that the democracies could easily have stopped Hitler
before he plunged the world into war and holocaust, but lacked the
will to do so, does not survive serious scrutiny. Appeasement proved
to be a horribly misguided policy against Hitler, but this conclusion is
clear only in hindsight—i.e., through the lens of subsequent events.
Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at appeasement within the
context of the political and military environments in which British
and French leaders operated during the 1930s. He examines the
nature of appeasement, the factors underlying Anglo-French policies
toward Hitler from 1933 to 1939, and the reasons for the failure of
those policies. He ﬁnds that Anglo-French security choices were
neither simple nor obvious, that hindsight has distorted judgments
on those choices, that Hitler remains without equal as a state threat,
and that invocations of the Munich analogy should always be closely
examined.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph
as a contribution to the national security debate over the use of force
to advance the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
No historical event has exerted more inﬂuence on post-World War
II U.S. use-of-force decisions than the Anglo-French appeasement of
Nazi Germany that led to the outbreak of the Second World War.
Presidents have repeatedly cited the great lesson of the 1930s—namely,
that force should be used early and decisively against rising security
threats—to justify decisions for war and military intervention; some
presidents have compared enemy leaders to Hitler. The underlying
assumption of the so-called Munich analogy is that the democracies
could and should have stopped Hitler (thereby avoiding World War
II and the Holocaust) by moving against him militarily before 1939.
This assumption, however, is easy to make only in hindsight and
ignores the political, military, economic, and psychological contexts of
Anglo-French security choices during the 1930s. Among the myriad
factors constraining those choices were memories of the horrors
of World War I, failure to grasp the nature of the Nazi regime and
Hitler’s strategic ambitions, France’s military inﬂexibility, Britain’s
strategic overstretch, France’s strategic dependence on Britain, guilt
over the Versailles Treaty of 1919, dread of strategic bombing and
misjudgment of the Nazi air threat, American isolationism, and
distrust of the Soviet Union and fear of Communism.
Appeasement failed because Hitler was unappeasable. He sought
not to adjust the European balance of power in Germany’s favor,
but rather to overthrow it. He wanted a German-ruled Europe that
would have eliminated France and Britain as European powers. But
Hitler was also undeterrable; he embraced war because he knew he
could not get what he wanted without it. There was thus little that
the democracies could do to deter Hitler from war, though Hitler
expected war later than 1939. There was going to be war as long as
Hitler remained in power.
A reassessment of the history of appeasement in the 1930s
yields the following conclusions: ﬁrst, Hitler remains unequaled
as a state threat. No post-1945 threat to the United States bears
genuine comparison to the Nazi dictatorship. Second, Anglo-French
security choices in the 1930s were neither simple nor obvious; they
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were shaped and constrained by factors ignored or misunderstood
by those who retrospectively have boiled them down to a simple
choice between good and evil. Third, hindsight is not 20/20 vision;
it distorts. We view past events through the prism of what followed.
Had Hitler dropped dead before 1939, there would have been no
World War II or Holocaust, and therefore no transformation of the
very term “appeasement” into a pejorative. Finally, invocations of
the Munich analogy to justify the use of force are almost invariably
misleading because security threats to the United States genuinely
Hitlerian in scope and nature have not been replicated since 1945.
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APPEASEMENT RECONSIDERED:
INVESTIGATING THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE 1930s
There was never a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action
than the one which has just desolated great areas of the globe. It could
have been prevented without the ﬁring of a single shot, but no one would
listen.
—Winston Churchill, 19461
Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances.
Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal.
Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be
the surest and only path to world peace.
—Winston Churchill, 19502

INTRODUCTION
No historical event has exerted more inﬂuence on post-World
War II U.S. presidential use-of-force decisions than the AngloFrench appeasement of Nazi Germany that led to the outbreak of
that war. The great lesson drawn from appeasement—namely, that
capitulating to the demands of territorially aggressive dictatorships
simply makes inevitable a later and larger war on less favorable
terms—has informed virtually every major U.S. use of force since
the surrender of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in 1945.3 From
the Harry S Truman administration’s 1950 decision to ﬁght in Korea
to the George W. Bush administration’s 2003 decision to invade Iraq,
presidents repeatedly have relied on the Munich analogy to inform
themselves on what to do in a perceived security crisis; they have
also employed that analogy as a tool for mobilizing public opinion
for military action. Indeed, presidents who most often invoked the
Munich analogy to describe a security threat believed the analogy to
be valid and understood its power as an opinion swayer.
As the United States approached its second war with Iraq, neoconservatives and other war proponents cited the consequences of the
democracies’ appeasement of the burgeoning Nazi menace during
1

the 1930s and asserted that war was necessary to remove Saddam
Hussein before he acquired nuclear weapons, with which he would
threaten and even attack the United States. Munich’s great lesson,
they argued, was to move early and decisively against rising security
threats. World War II could have been avoided had the democracies
been prepared to stop Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in
1936 or to ﬁght for Czechoslovakia in 1938; instead, they did nothing
when three German army battalions crossed into the Rhineland’s left
bank, and they handed over vital chunks of Czech territory. With
each act of appeasement, Hitler’s appetite grew. Thus military action
against a prenuclear Saddam Hussein in 2003 would be much easier
and less risky than war with a nuclear Saddam later on. War with
Saddam was inevitable, as it was with Hitler, so it was better to have
it earlier on more favorable terms rather than later on less favorable
ones.
Neo-conservative Richard Perle, the inﬂuential chairman of the
Defense Policy Board, argued in an August 2002 interview with the
London Daily Telegraph:
[An] action to remove Saddam could precipitate the very thing we are
most anxious to prevent: his use of chemical and biological weapons.
But the danger that springs from his capabilities will only grow as he
expands his arsenal. A preemptive strike against Hitler at the time of
Munich would have meant an immediate war, as opposed to the one that
came later. Later was much worse.4

In that same month, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a
television interview in which arose the issue of evidence of Saddam
Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, opined, “Think of all the
countries that said, ‘Well, we don’t have enough evidence.’ Mein
Kampf had been written. Hitler had indicated what he intended to
do. Maybe he won’t attack us. . . . Well, there are millions of dead
because of those miscalculations.” Later, he added, “Maybe Winston
Churchill was right. Maybe that lone voice expressing concerns
about what was happening was right.” As early as January 2002,
President George W. Bush was talking the talk of preventive war as
a means of dealing with a rising enemy bent on domination. “Time
is not on our side,” he said in his State of the Union Address. “I
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will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by
as peril draws closer and closer. The United States will not permit
the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s
most dangerous weapons.”5
For neo-conservatives who have provided the intellectual
foundation of U.S. foreign policy since September 11, 2001 (9/11)
(enshrined in President Bush’s September 2002 The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America), the failure of the democracies
to stop Hitler in the 1930s remains the primary instruction on
both international politics and America’s role in the world. In his
trenchant assessment of the propositions that comprise the essence
of neo-conservative thinking on foreign policy, Andrew J. Bacevich
correctly identiﬁes “the ﬁrst and most fundamental proposition” to
be “a theory of history” based on “two large truths” originating from
the decade of the 1930s—namely, that “evil is real,” and that “for
evil to prevail requires only one thing: for those confronted by it
to ﬂinch from duty.”6 From this proposition ﬂows the imperative
of possessing irresistible military power and a willingness to use
it; the identiﬁcation of the United States as the only power capable
of standing up to evil; and the necessary dedication of the United
States to the mission of removing evil from the world. As President
Bush declared just 3 days after the 9/11 attacks, “our responsibility
to history is already clear: To answer these attacks and rid the world
of evil.”7
Presidential invocation of the Munich analogy as an argument
for use of force began with the outbreak of the Korean War. For
Truman, the analogy dictated U.S. intervention: “Communism
was acting in Korea just as Hitler and the Japanese had acted 10, 15,
20 years earlier.”8 A year after the Korean War ended, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, citing the “domino effects” of a Communist victory in
Indochina on the rest of Southeast Asia, invoked Munich in an appeal
for Anglo-American military action: “We failed to halt Hirohito,
Mussolini, and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. . . . May it
not be that [we] have learned something from that lesson?”9 John F.
Kennedy cited the Munich analogy during the Cuban Missile Crisis,
warning that the “1930s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct,
if allowed to go unchecked, ultimately leads to war.”10
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The analogy indisputably propelled the United States into
Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson told his Secretary of Defense, Robert
McNamara, that if the United States pulled out of Vietnam, “The
dominoes would fall and a part of the world would go communist.”11
Johnson later told historian Doris Kearns, “Everything I knew about
history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh
run through the streets of Saigon, then I’d be doing exactly what
Chamberlain did . . . I’d be giving a fat reward to aggression.”12
Richard Nixon also believed Munich applied to Vietnam. In his
memoirs, he approvingly quoted Churchill’s condemnation of the
1938 Munich Agreement and then went on to conclude that “what
had been true of the betrayal of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in 1938
was no less true of the betrayal of South Vietnam to the communists
advocated by many in 1965.”13
Ronald Reagan saw in the Soviet Union a replay of the challenges
the democracies faced in the 1930s and invoked the Munich analogy
to justify a major U.S. military buildup as well as U.S. intervention in
Grenada and Nicaragua. “One of the great tragedies of this century,”
he remarked in a 1983 speech, “was that it was only after the balance
of power was allowed to erode and a ruthless adversary, Adolph
Hitler, deliberately weighed the risks and decided to strike that the
importance of a strong defense was realized.”14 Shortly after Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, President George H. W. Bush, the last
occupant of the White House to perform military service in World
War II, declared: “If history teaches anything, it is that we must resist
aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not
work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an
aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.”15
The inﬂuence of the Munich analogy has persisted beyond the
generation of decisionmakers who served in World War II. President
William J. Clinton, the ﬁrst president born after World War II, did
not hesitate to invoke the Munich analogy against Serbian dictator
Slobodan Milosevic. “What if someone had listened to Winston
Churchill and stood up to Adolph Hitler earlier?” he asked shortly
before going to war over Kosovo. “How many people’s lives might
have been saved? And how many American lives might have
been saved?”16 George W. Bush, like his father before him, painted
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Saddam Hussein as an Arab Hitler bent on acquiring unstoppable
power (nuclear weapons) and pursuing an agenda of aggression
(domination of the Persian Gulf). On the eve of launching Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, he observed that in “the 20th century, some chose
to appease murderous dictators, whose threats were allowed to grow
into genocide and global war.”17
Though presidents can and have, knowingly and unwittingly,
misused the Munich analogy to describe security threats and the
consequences of failing to act against them,18 there is no gainsaying
the power of that analogy to mobilize public opinion. This is so
because of the catastrophic failure of the security policies Britain and
France pursued vis-à-vis Germany in the 1930s. In retrospect, AngloFrench appeasement, driven by perceived military weakness and fear
of war, did nothing but whet Hitler’s insatiable territorial appetite
(and his contempt for British and French political leadership), while
simultaneously undermining the democracies’ security. The result
was the most destructive war in history and an enduring pejorative
image of appeasement whose casting includes Nazi ideology as a selfevident blueprint of Germany’s territorial aims; Neville Chamberlain
as a coward and fool bent on peace at any price; Britain and France
as betrayers of brave little Czechoslovakia; and Hitler as the great
winner at the Munich Conference of September 1938.
This is the image of appeasement that presidents have employed
to justify selection of military action over inaction in response to
perceived security threats. The great strategic lesson of the 1930s,
however, was drawn against a rising security threat that arguably
has had no analog since the destruction of Nazi Germany and
Imperial Japan. Security threats truly Hitlerian in scope are rare.
What aggressor state since 1945 has possessed the combination of
such territorial ambitions, military power, and willingness to gamble
strategically as did Nazi Germany in Europe in 1939? Certainly
not North Vietnam or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, both targets of U.S.
presidential invocation of the Munich analogy. To be sure, the
Soviet Union had great military power and imperial ambitions. But
Stalin and his successors (Khrushchev in 1961-1962 excepted) were
far more patient and cautious men than Hitler, and Soviet use of
force was, in any event, checked by America’s nuclear deterrent
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and NATO’s containment on the ground in Europe to a degree that
Hitler never was in peacetime. China may turn out to be America’s
next great strategic rival, but the extent of her imperial ambitions
in East Asia (beyond Taiwan) remains unclear. China, moreover,
greatly depends on access to the American market for her economic
progress and increasingly depends on oil from a Persian Gulf where
U.S. military hegemony remains unchallenged.
This is not to argue that threats need be Nazi Germanic in
magnitude to justify military action. Saddam Hussein’s aggression
against Kuwait in 1990 was unacceptable because it violated a cardinal
international norm and because it challenged U.S. domination in a
region of vital interest to the West. Similarly, Serbian aggression in
the former Yugoslavia had to be stopped because it was genocidal
and threatened NATO’s integrity. The Taliban also had to be driven
from power because they provided a sanctuary for the attackers of
9/11. And the United States could not stand by idly if China chose
to attack Taiwan.
The problem with the invocation of Munich is its suggestion
that aggressor states are inherently insatiable and that failure to act
against them automatically endangers U.S. security. In fact, most
aggressor states have limited territorial objectives, and in some cases
satisfaction of those objectives may be of little consequence to U.S.
security. North Vietnam’s objectives were conﬁned to the former
French Indochina, a place of little intrinsic strategic value to the United
States. Yet the administration of Lyndon Johnson painted Ho Chi
Minh as the spear point of a concerted Sino-Soviet imperialism and
claimed that a Communist victory in South Vietnam would topple
dominoes all over Southeast Asia. Saddam Hussein was certainly
Hitlerian in his brutality, recklessness, and appetite for aggression,
but the military threat he posed was never a match for the power
the United States could—and did in 1990-91—mobilize against him;
by 2003 the Iraqi threat had been broken by 12 years of war and
sanctions, though Saddam continued to run a monstrous tyranny
and to defy UN demands that he account for suspected prohibited
weapons stocks. There was no counterpart in the Europe of the 1930s
to the superpowerdom of the United States in the Gulf over the past
2 decades. Stephen Rock observes that “Not every state that makes
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demands has unlimited ambitions.”19 Unfortunately, notes Robert
Jervis, “Our memories of Hitler have tended to obscure the fact that
most states are unwilling to pay an exorbitant price for a chance at
expansion.”20 To contend that Saddam Hussein was not Hitler is not
necessarily to argue against the U.S. decision to invade Iraq; there
was always a powerful moral and legal case for Saddam Hussein’s
overthrow, and the future course of events in Iraq and the Middle
East may well determine the ﬁnal judgment on the wisdom of that
decision.
If it is important to understand the rarity of genuinely Hitlerian
threats, it is no less important to recognize that France and Britain
faced security challenges and dilemmas in the 1930s that were
too daunting and complex to be distilled into the simple choice
between the “good” of stopping Hitler militarily and the “evil” of
appeasing him politically. Though allies in the Great War, France
and Britain still did not fully trust one another (much of Britain’s
social elite was Germanophile, and much of its political elite was
Gallophobic21). Until the late 1930s, moreover, London and Paris
differed profoundly on how to deal with Hitler, a function in part
of differing vulnerabilities to German land power, and in part
of differing views on the wisdom of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.
Though Britain was more geographically secure, she faced not only
a perceived direct German air threat but also increasingly threatened
imperial interests in the Mediterranean and East Asia. The defense
of the British Isles competed with the defense of the Empire. With
respect to Nazi Germany, Britain also had to wrestle with the question
of whether it could limit its liability in a future European war to the
provision of naval and air power (banking on sufﬁcient continental
allies to supply the ground forces).
For its part, France, plagued by governmental instability (between
1932 and 1940 there were no fewer than 16 coalition governments in
Paris22) and acute internal political divisions that culminated in the
defeatism and collaboration of 1940, sought to “contain” Germany
through a system of alliances that would confront Berlin with the
prospect of a two-front war. From 1936 on, however, France never
displayed the will and military capacity necessary to convince
potential Eastern allies (or even Belgium, for that matter) that, in the
event of war, it was prepared to defend them by attacking Germany.
7

Additionally, France believed it could not act alone without Britain,
but Britain would not act at all until Hitler had isolated London and
Paris from the rest of Europe. Given these circumstances, together
with a gross overestimation of the German strategic air threat, it is
hardly surprising that senior British and French military leaders
throughout the period 1933-39 unanimously counseled against
risking war with Germany. Going to war against contrary professional military advice is a very risky business for any democratic
politician unless he has the electorate behind him, which British
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain did not in 1938 but did in
1939.
Harry Hearder, in his forward to the second edition of P. M. H.
Bell’s The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, perhaps the most
objective assessment of the causes of World War II published to date,
rightly concludes that “a blanket condemnation” of appeasement
“is too imprecise to be tenable, and, indeed, explains nothing.” He
further deplores the continuing inﬂuence of the appeasement myth:
The trouble is that vague, sweeping generalizations tend to be accepted
by an ill-informed public, and build themselves up into powerful myths.
Such generalizations may be accepted by the media and the public for
several decades after they have been discarded by most professional
historians. Most journalists seem to think that the policy of appeasement
was, in each of the relevant crises, cowardly and mistaken. They do not
distinguish between the factors that were operative in 1936 from those
operative in 1938 or again in 1939.23

Indeed, appeasement was never about peace at any price; had it been,
neither Britain nor France would have gone to war in September 1939
over a Poland neither was in a position to defend. Appeasement was
about war avoidance consistent with preservation of vital national
interests.
* * * * *
This monograph: (1) examines the nature of appeasement; (2)
explores the reasons why Britain and France chose to appease Nazi
Germany; (3) assesses the causes of appeasement’s failure; and (4)
offers a judgment on the utility of the Munich analogy as an informant
on the use of force.
8

Before turning to the nature of appeasement, however, it is
critical to recognize that though Anglo-French appeasement of Nazi
Germany was a horrendous mistake, decisionmakers in London and
Paris during the 1930s did not know they were making “pre-World
War II” decisions. On the contrary, they were struggling mightily to
avoid war. We must attempt to see the security choices they faced
and the decisions they made as they saw them then, not as we see
them today. With historical events, as with professional football
games, it is far easier to be a Monday morning quarterback than an
actual Sunday afternoon quarterback in the middle of a tough game.
Nor does hindsight offer 20-20 vision; hindsight refracts past events
through the lens of what followed. Thus we view Munich today
through the prism of World War II and the Holocaust, a perspective
not available in 1938. How differently would Munich now be seen
had it not been followed by war? David Potter shrewdly observes
that hindsight is “the historian’s chief asset and his main liability.”24
THE NATURE OF APPEASEMENT
Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus deﬁnes the verb
“appease” as “to pacify, quiet, or satisfy, especially by giving into
the demands of,” and lists the following synonyms for the noun
“appeasement”: “amends, settlement, reparation, conciliation,
compromise.”25 These terms are consistent with what most
historians and international relations theorists understand to be
the phenomenon of appeasement: states seeking to adjust or settle
their differences by measures short of war. Stephen Rock deﬁnes
appeasement as simply “the policy of reducing tensions with one’s
adversary by removing the causes of conﬂict and disagreement,”26
a deﬁnition echoed by Gordon Craig and Alexander George: “the
reduction of tension between [two states] by the methodical removal
of the principal causes of conﬂict and disagreement between them.”27
To be sure, Anglo-French behavior toward Nazi Germany gave
appeasement such a bad name that the term is no longer usable except
as a political pejorative. Before Munich, however, observes historian
Paul Kennedy, “the policy of settling international . . . quarrels by
admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation
and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conﬂict
9

which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous”
was generally viewed as “constructive, positive, and honorable.”28
Even after World War II, Winston Churchill, the great anti-appeaser
of Hitler, declared that appeasement could be (if driven from a
position of strength as opposed to weakness) “magnanimous and
noble,” and perhaps “the surest and only path to world peace.”
But the success or failure of appeasement depends on more than
whether the appeasing state is dealing from a position of strength
or weakness. Much depends on the nature and objectives of the
state toward which appeasement is directed. A state bent on war or
possessing territorial or ideological objectives that cannot be satisﬁed
short of war is most unlikely to be appeasable (though it may be
deterrable); conversely, a state seeking to avoid war and having
limited objectives whose satisfaction does not threaten core security
interests of the appeasing state is likely to be appeasable.
An oft-cited case of successful appeasement was Britain’s
appeasement of the United States from 1896 to 1903.29 By the 1890s,
the number and power of Britain’s potential enemies were growing.
Britain had no great power allies and faced rising imperial challenges
from Germany and Russia, on top of continuing traditional tensions
with France and the United States. Tensions with an industrially
expanding Germany became especially acute when Berlin in 1898
decided to challenge British naval supremacy in European waters.
Accordingly, Britain decided to reduce the potential demands on its
military power by resolving its outstanding disputes with the United
States—speciﬁcally by meeting American demands that Britain
explicitly accept the Monroe Doctrine; submit British Guiana’s border
dispute with Venezuela to international arbitration; agree to U.S.
construction, operation, and fortiﬁcation of an inter-oceanic canal
through Central America; and settle an Alaskan-Canadian border
dispute in Washington’s favor. None of these concessions involved
vital British security interests, which in fact were advanced by
transforming the world’s greatest industrial power from a potential
enemy into a friend (and later) indispensable ally. Accepting
American dominance within the Western Hemisphere not only laid
the foundation of U.S. entry on Britain’s side in World War I; it also
permitted a British naval evacuation of the Western Hemisphere for
operations in the European waters.
10

But London’s success with the Americans in the 1890s was not to
be repeated with the Germans in the 1930s.
WHY APPEASEMENT?
Anglo-French appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s arose
from multiple, mutually reinforcing sources.
Memories of the Great War.
In 1914, the outbreak of war in Europe was greeted with great
enthusiasm among the publics of the belligerents. The almost
universal expectation was that the war would be short and decisive.
War was still held to be a necessary and glorious enterprise—a
relief from the “boredom” of peace and the “soulessness” of
industrialization.30 In 1939, the outbreak of World War II in Europe
was nowhere greeted by the cheering crowds of 1914. Even in
Germany there was no exaltation outside Nazi Party circles, only a
sullen resignation. Across Europe the expectation was of a long and
bloody war, perhaps even a repeat of the Great War. (In fact, World
War II lasted 2 years longer and claimed perhaps 40 million more
lives than World War I.)
It is virtually impossible to underestimate the inﬂuence of the
slaughter of 1914-18 on ofﬁcial and public opinion in Europe during
the 1920s and 1930s. “Every country was affected in some way by the
First World War, and its legacy hung like a shadow over international
relations during the inter-war period,” observes Frank McDonough.
“Over 60 million Europeans fought in the war, 7 million died, and 21
million were disabled or seriously wounded. Over 4 million women
lost husbands, and 8 million children lost fathers.”31 The war had
an especially profound impact on opinion in the primary appeasing
power of the 1930s, Britain, where vivid memories of the lost
comrades and loved ones and the special horrors of trench warfare
bred an electorate of which signiﬁcant segments were either paciﬁst
or unwilling to contemplate the use of force outside the authority of
the collective security framework of the League of Nations. In the
case of Neville Chamberlain, who became prime minister in 1937
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and whose name has become synonymous with appeasement, there
was a simple inability to imagine that any European statesman, even
Hitler, could or would wish to risk a repetition of the Great War. In
the 1920s and 1930s, observes P. M. H. Bell,
it appeared to most statesmen in Britain and France that war was highly
unlikely to pay. They had come to regard the last war, of 1914-18, as a
calamity, involving human, material, and ﬁnancial losses which should
not again be incurred short of the utmost necessity. They were satisﬁed
powers anxious to preserve the status quo; but they also wanted peace
and quiet. They would eventually ﬁght in self-defense and to prevent
the status quo from being completely overthrown; but their optimism
about the outcome of war was at a low ebb, and their belief in war as an
instrument of policy was weak.32

Failure to Grasp the Nature of the Nazi Regime
and Hitler’s Strategic Ambitions.
Among the sources of appeasement, misjudgment of Hitler’s
intentions was perhaps paramount. British leaders, most notably
Chamberlain, were especially guilty on this count. Yet even after the
war, the eminent British historian A. J. P. Taylor sought to prove that
Hitler was a “normal” European leader practicing the opportunism
of realpolitik on behalf of liberating Germany from the shackles of
Versailles and restoring Germany to a political status commensurate
with its population and industrial power. “Hitler was no more wicked
and unscrupulous than many other contemporary statesmen.”
Hitler’s professed ideology consisted of nothing but “day-dreams,”
and Hitler ended up in Russia because “his judgment was corrupted
by easy victories,” not because he really believed it was Germany’s
racial destiny to carve out massive lebensraum (living space) in the
Slavic East.33
Taylor’s thesis was never convincing and has been thoroughly
discredited by subsequent analysis.34 The thesis could never account
for Nazi behavior in Russia or the Holocaust; more generally,
it willfully ignored the power of ideas in international politics.
Much of Hitler’s foreign policy was rooted in the foreign policies
of Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic, but Hitler’s racial
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and territorial objectives in Europe, to say nothing of his profound
craving for war, lay beyond the boundaries of pre-Nazi German
foreign policy.35 Hitler’s ideology deﬁned the scope of his territorial
ambitions in Europe, especially in the East. To be sure, he was a
supreme opportunist and sought to revise the Versailles Treaty in so
far as it held Germany down militarily and “imprisoned” much of
the German nation outside the German state. But revisionism was
but an enabling precondition for action on a much larger agenda
of racial conquest and enslavement. “Race, far from being a mere
propagandistic slogan, was the very rock on which the Nazi Church
was built,” observes Norman Rich in his masterful assessment of
Hitler’s war aims.36
Hitler was hardly the ﬁrst political leader to marry tactical
opportunism and strategic vision, but strategic vision he manifestly
possessed. Historian Gerhard Weinberg correctly believes that Hitler
had “a clearly formulated set of ideas on major issues of foreign policy”
and “was able to impress his ideas on events rather than allow events
and realities to reshape his ideas.”37 Hitler was a racial Darwinist,
and his ideas centered on Aryan (Nordic) racial superiority and
the imperative of carving out additional agriculturally productive
lebensraum for the Aryan community between the Vistula and the
Urals. Racial survival depended on racial expansion and racial
expansion depended on spacial expansion. But spacial expansion
also meant inevitable war, since those inferior races occupying the
vital living space could not be expected to voluntarily submit to the
new racial order. And since war was inevitable, it necessarily became
a preferred policy option rather than a measure of last resort.38
Thus Hitler was not just another conservative German nationalist.
Though many conservative nationalists supported Hitler, “Nazism
went further,” notes P. M. H. Bell.
The restoration of the old German Empire, even at its furthest extent,
was not enough; and conservative nationalists found that their country
was launched on a war of racial conquest with unlimited objectives that
was almost certain to end with disaster. At different times from 1937
onwards, and with varying degrees of commitment, numbers of German
conservatives parted company with the Nazi regime; though they failed
to check its growing momentum.39
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But this is all clear in hindsight. At the time, most observers
dismissed Hitler’s ideological rantings on race and lebensraum as grist
for domestic political consumption. The highly respected economist,
Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, a traditional conservative who was sacked
by Hitler as Reichsbank president in 1939 for opposing Germany’s
unbridled rearmament and who was arrested and jailed in the wake
of the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler’s life, told an interviewer after
the war that, during the 1920s and early 1930s, “No one took [Hitler’s]
anti-Semitism seriously. We thought it was a political propaganda
issue and would be forgotten once he got into power.”40 Taken at face
value, Hitler’s vision of an Aryan empire stretching to the Urals was
nothing short of fantastic; it would require the conquest of Eastern
Europe, destruction of the Soviet Union, and “ethnic cleansing on
a grotesque scale,” objectives beyond Germany’s strengths and
unacceptable to the European balance of power.41
Ravings aside, was not treaty revision Hitler’s real objective?
Until March 1939, when Hitler invaded the non-Germanic rump
of Czechoslovakia, it was quite plausible to believe that Hitler’s
military ambitions were limited to rearmament and his territorial
ambitions to Germanic Europe. Most British leaders were convinced
that it had been a strategic mistake to have imposed the harsh
Versailles Treaty on Germany, and that the treaty was in any event
unenforceable; with few exceptions they “insisted on placing German
aspirations within the traditional European continental balance of
power, and within the system of national self-determination for all
people established by [Woodrow] Wilson in 1918.”42 On this basis,
Hitler was appeasable. Was it not ridiculous to think that Germany
could be kept in a permanent state of disarmament (including the
Rhineland’s demilitarization) while the rest of Europe was armed?
Did not Germany have a right to equality in this regard? Until 1939,
Hitler’s territorial demands (union with Austria and acquisition of
Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland) suggested no appetite for further
expansionism and its attendant risk of general war.
Indeed, Czechoslovakia itself was an affront to the principle of selfdetermination. Cobbled together in the name of self-determination
from ashes of the Hapsburg Empire, it was less a national state
than a collection of territorially based nationalities—3,250,000
Germans (concentrated in the western and northern Czech border
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areas with Germany), 6,500,000 Czechs (in Bohemia and Moravia),
about 3,000,000 Slovaks (mostly in the eastern half of the country),
plus 700,000 Hungarians, 500,000 Ukrainians, and 60,000 Poles.43
The Czechs, who dominated the country’s political and military
leadership, were a minority in their own country. Czechoslovakia
proved to be as unsustainable as the former Yugoslavia: after the
Cold War, both jerry-rigged Hapsburg successor states disintegrated,
Czechoslovakia peacefully into the successor states of the Czech
Republic and Slovakia (the Russians had expelled the Sudeten
Germans in 1945), and Yugoslavia in an orgy of ethnic slaughter. No
British government in September 1938 would have been prepared to
go to war with Germany on the wrong side of the principle of selfdetermination and especially on behalf of a state to which Britain
had no defense obligation.
Neville Chamberlain believed that Hitler could be sated by
territorial concessions, that the dictator, like Bismark before him,
understood the limits of German power, and that he could not
possibly want to plunge his country and the rest of Europe into
another general war. Chamberlain did not understand, as historian
Paul Kennedy notes, “that Hitler was fundamentally unappeasable
and determined upon a future territorial order which small-scale
adjustments could never satisfy.”44 More profoundly he failed
to understand, as did Winston Churchill, that the very nature of
the Nazi regime barred any possibility of any long-term working
strategic relationship with British democracy.45
That said, Chamberlain was a forceful leader who dominated his
cabinet; indeed, his “dramatic offer to ﬂy to Berchtesgaden [to meet
Hitler] effectively removed from Hitler’s hands the orchestration
and control of the [Czech] crisis.”46 (The 69-year-old prime minister
had never ﬂown before.) He was not prepared to accept a Germandominated Europe; indeed, it had long been a cardinal principle
of British statecraft to align against continental powers bent on
continental domination. When Hitler betrayed his promise of
no further territorial demands at Munich by invading the rest of
Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Chamberlain and French Premier
Edouard Daladier promptly extended defense guarantees to Poland,
Hitler’s obvious next target. The British guarantee was extraordinary
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because Britain was in no position to provide even indirect military
assistance to Poland. The guarantee was an attempt at deterrence
via the threat of general war.
Unfortunately, by the summer of 1939, the credibility of such
a threat had been vitiated by the record of Anglo-French inaction
over the Rhineland’s remilitarization, inaction over the Austrian
Anschluss, and the sell-out of Czechoslovakia (which enjoyed a
mutual defense treaty with France). Hitler did not believe the British
and French would go to war over Poland. In response to expressed
concerns that they might, Hitler told his assembled generals on
the eve of the invasion of Poland, “Our enemies are worms. I saw
them at Munich.”47 Additionally, Hitler simply could not accept the
possibility that the British “wanted to ﬁght for a country they could
not save.”48
Stephen Rock, in his path-breaking assessment, Appeasement in
International Politics, concludes that appeasement is an appropriate
policy only under two basic conditions:
First, the adversary must not be unalterably committed to the behavior
the appeasing state seeks to modify. The use of force, for example, if
contemplated by the opponent, must be viewed as instrumental to the
acquisition of a particular objective, not as an essential end in and of
itself. Second, the adversary must be susceptible to inducements that is
[sic] within the political and material capacity of the appeaser to make.
If the adversary is motivated by opportunity/greed, this implies that
there are limits to its demands; if motivated by insecurity, it implies that
leaders are not impervious to the reassuring effects of an appeasement
policy. The latter condition is most likely to be met when the adversary’s
insecurity is primarily a function of the appeaser’s recent actions, rather
than political leaders’ ideology, worldview, or paranoid mentality.49

Against Hitler in the 1930s, neither of these conditions was satisﬁed—
or satisﬁable.
France’s Military Inﬂexibility.
The French suffered fewer illusions about Hitler’s intentions
in Europe,50 but they had, even before 1933, voluntarily stripped
themselves of a critical hallmark of great power status: a willingness
and capacity to attack other great powers. Indeed, next to mis16

judging Hitler’s intentions in Europe, the second greatest source of
appeasement was France’s strategic self-paralysis. Determined to
avoid the horrendous blood losses of 1914-18, alarmed by France’s
growing industrial and demographic inferiority to Germany,
shackled by a 1-year term of service for conscripts, and convinced
of the tactical and strategic superiority of the defense over the
offense, the French General Staff embraced a rigid defensive military
doctrine and a reserve mobilization-dependent army that precluded
offensive military action into German territory.51 The French would
await a German attack behind the Maginot Line, a formidable line of
fortiﬁcations that conserved French manpower, while mobilizing the
full strength of their army. The peacetime French army was, in fact,
little more than a skeleton on which the wartime force mobilized; it
lacked a standing mobile strike force.
There was nothing inherently wrong with this force posture
(except the inexplicable failure of the French to extend the Maginot
Line along the Franco-Belgian border after the Belgians dissolved
their mutual defense alliance with France). The problem was that a
purely defensive military posture did not support France’s diplomatic
strategy; on the contrary, it completely undercut that strategy.
In seeking to deter a German attack by confronting Berlin with
the prospect of a two-front war, France sought allies in the East—
Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia—that
could tie down German forces that otherwise could be thrown at
France. Yet for such Eastern allies, France’s value as an ally depended
on France’s willingness and ability to attack Germany in the West,
thereby tying down forces that would otherwise be available for
Eastern employment. Observes Henry Kissinger: “None of the new
states of Eastern Europe stood a chance of defending themselves
against a revisionist Germany, either through their own efforts or
in combination with each other. Their only hope was that France
could deter German aggression by threatening to march into the
Rhineland.”52 Yet as General Maurice Gamelin, the Chief of the French
General Staff, confessed after Germany’s military reoccupation of
the Rhineland in 1936, “The idea of sending a French expeditionary
corps into the Rhineland, even in a more or less symbolic form, is
unrealistic. . . . our military system does not give us this possibility.
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Our active army is only the nucleus of the mobilized national
army. . . . None of our units are capable of being placed instantly on
a complete war footing.”53
In the Inter-War period France had created, in the words of
Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, the great French historian of French
diplomacy during the 1930s, “two contradictory security systems. . . .
a [political]system of Eastern alliances and an alliance with Belgium
. . . [and] a defensive [military] posture preparing a vast mobilization
behind a fortiﬁed frontier.”54 Both deterrence and coercive diplomacy
rest on credibly threatened force, and France lacked the political
will and military capacity to make credible threats of force. French
diplomacy called for a military hammer, but the French military
provided only an anvil.
In this regard, Hitler’s military reoccupation of the Rhineland in
March 1936 was a much greater strategic disaster for the democracies
than the sellout of Czechoslovakia in September 1938, but not because
the Rhineland remilitarization blocked a French attack into Germany;
France, as we have seen, had no intention of attacking Germany even
through an undefended Rhineland. The disaster lay in the irreparable
blow to French prestige. French failure to ﬁre a single shot at token
German military forces entering territory so vital to France’s security
advertised France to the rest of the Continent as a feckless security
partner. French inaction reinforced Belgium’s decision to drop its
alliance with France in favor of neutrality,55 exposing France to the
very German attack that was delivered through Belgium 4 years
later; it encouraged Mussolini, who in thwarting a Berlin-sponsored
Nazi coup in Austria 2 years earlier had handed Hitler a major
foreign policy defeat,56 to move closer to the German dictator; it left
Austria exposed to virtually certain German annexation, thereby
compromising Czechoslovakia’s defense; and it undermined the
Eastern allies’ conﬁdence in France. The Rhineland debacle even
prompted Pope Pius XI to tell the French ambassador that, “Had
you ordered the immediate advance of 200,000 men into the zone the
Germans had occupied, you would have done everyone a very great
favor.”57
But it was not just what France lost in the Rhineland; it was also
what Hitler gained. Hitler later admitted that the ﬁrst “48 hours after
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the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking of my
life” because if French forces had entered the Rhineland in response,
“we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs,
for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly
inadequate for even a moderate resistance.”58 As it was, concluded
William L. Shirer:
Hitler’s successful gamble in the Rhineland brought him a victory more
staggering and more fatal in its immense consequences than could be
comprehended at the time. At home it fortiﬁed his popularity and his
power, raising them to heights which no German ruler of the past had
ever enjoyed. . . . It taught [his generals] that in foreign affairs and even in
military affairs his judgment was superior to theirs. They had feared that
the French would ﬁght; he knew better. And ﬁnally, and above all, the
Rhineland occupation, small as it was as a military operation, opened the
way, as only Hitler (and Churchill, alone, in England) seemed to realize,
to vast new opportunities in a Europe which was not only shaken but
whose strategic situation was irrevocably changed by the parading of
three German battalions across the Rhine bridges.59

The foundation of French appeasement was military incapacity
to act against Germany. This incapacity was inexcusable, given that
France was, unlike Britain, directly menaced overland by Germany,
suffered fewer illusions about Nazi ambitions in Europe, required
allies in Eastern Europe, possessed the largest army in Europe (upon
mobilization), and was far less strategically stressed than Britain by
threatened imperial defense obligations.
That said, it is important to recognize that both French and
international military opinion had considerable conﬁdence that
France could put up a stiff defense against a German invasion—that
French defenses were sufﬁciently strong to force Germany into a
protracted war which the German economy would be ill prepared to
sustain. There was a general belief in Britain and France that another
world war would be a long attritional contest in which Germany
would be worn down to the point of exhaustion by superior Allied
resources (which, in fact, proved to be the case, though not for
France). Indeed, a war of attrition, it was believed, was the only
strategy available to inﬂict a decisive military defeat on Germany.
The stunning blitzkrieg of May-June 1940 was foreseen by no one,
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including the Germans, who in the event were surprised by the
speed and totality of the Allied collapse. Nor was it foreseen that
Hitler would conquer sufﬁcient resources in Europe to deny Britain
and France any chance of victory through attrition. Even Churchill
understood, after the fall of France in June 1940, that the British
empire had no hope of defeating Hitler absent Soviet and American
entry into the war (which Hitler promptly supplied in June and
December 1941, respectively). Indeed, given Britain’s strategic
position after the fall of Dunkirk, cold-blooded realism would have
dictated a settlement of the war with Germany (London’s recognition
of Germany’s domination of the Continent in exchange for Berlin’s
guarantee of the British Empire). Interest in such a settlement was
present within Churchill’s cabinet in the wake of Dunkirk, and
postwar historians who have sought to rehabilitate Chamberlain’s
reputation have argued that Churchill’s decision to ﬁght on was an
egregious mistake because it doomed Britain to loss of empire and
postwar strategic dependence on the United States.60
The twin convictions that the German economy could not
sustain a war of attrition and that Britain and France in alliance had
a good chance of imposing such a war on Germany in the event of
hostilities account in large measure for the lack of enthusiasm of
traditional German nationalists, including senior army leaders, for
any threatened or actual military action that risked general war.
The convictions also underpin the Anglo-French decision to go to
war with Germany in September 1939; states are not in the habit of
voluntarily entering wars they believe they will lose, and there was
little reason for Britain and France to believe that Germany could
defeat them outright. Neither London nor Paris wanted a war with
Germany, but they were ﬁnally persuaded they had to ﬁght one.
Britain’s Strategic Overstretch.
If French military credibility was compromised by bad strategy,
Britain’s was undercut by a multiplicity of military obligations
that far exceeded her capacity to act upon them. World War I had
greatly weakened Britain’s ﬁnancial power though she inherited
even greater imperial obligations as a result of the war’s destruction
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of the German and Turkish empires; during the 1930s, Britain still
controlled a quarter of the world but with only 9-10 percent of its
manufacturing strength and war production potential.61 Yet as the
1930s progressed, Britain faced a rising German threat in Europe,
a mounting Japanese threat in the Far East, and an expanding
Italian threat in the Mediterranean—Britain’s vital imperial line of
communication to India and the Far East via Gibraltar, Malta, and
the Suez Canal. Small wonder that in 1935 the Committee of Imperial
Defense (CID) concluded:
We consider it to be a cardinal requirement of our national and imperial
security that our foreign policy should be so conducted as to avoid . . .
a situation in which we might be confronted simultaneously with the
hostility, open or veiled, of Japan in the Far East, Germany in the West, and
any power on the main line of communication between the two. . . . [W]e
cannot foresee the time when our defense forces will be strong enough
to safeguard our territory, trade and vital interests against Germany,
Italy and Japan simultaneously. We cannot, therefore, exaggerate the
importance, from the point of view of Imperial defense, of any political
or international action that can be taken to reduce the numbers of our
potential enemies or to gain the support of potential allies.62

The call to reduce the numbers of Britain’s potential enemies
was a call to appease Germany or Italy or Japan in order to free up
military resources to deal with those who remained unappeased; it
was a call that was hardly unreasonable especially as the German
and Japanese threats greatly worsened during the 3 years separating
the CID assessment and the Czech crisis of September 1938.
Chamberlain had no global military running room by the time of
Munich. He certainly had no means of defending Czechoslovakia
or any other Eastern European state not readily accessible by sea. In
March 1938 the British Chiefs of Staff had submitted an assessment
on the implications of a German attack on Czechoslovakia that
concluded:
[N]o military pressure we can exact by sea, or land or in the air can prevent
Germany either from invading and overrunning Bohemia or inﬂicting a
decisive defeat on the Czechoslovakian army. If politically it is deemed
necessary to restore Czechoslovakia’s lost integrity, this aim will entail
war with Germany, and her defeat may mean a prolonged struggle. In
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short, we can do nothing to prevent the dog getting the bone, and we
have no means of making him give it up, except by killing him by a slow
process of attrition and starvation.63

Britain was not in a position to project military power east of
the Rhine; the Royal Navy was preoccupied with the Italian and
Japanese threats; and the Royal Air Force was in the middle of
rearming. Moreover, as Richard Overy points out, Chamberlain had
been prime minister for only a year, and he was “understandably not
prepared to crown that period by deliberately courting a war that all
his military advisers warned him would destroy the Empire.”64
Britain was not even in a position to contribute to the ground
defense of France and the Low Countries. The British army had
no deﬁned strategic role in the 1930s outside of home and imperial
defense, and it was not until after Munich that the Chamberlain
government reintroduced conscription and concluded that a
continental commitment for the British army was unavoidable.
Until 1939, British political leaders and such inﬂuential strategic
thinkers as B. H. Liddell Hart believed, or at least wanted to believe,
that Britain could limit its liability in a future European war by
restricting its role to the provision of naval and air power.65 (During
the Napoleonic era, noted Liddell Hart, Britain’s main contribution
to France’s defeat had been sea power and the extension of ﬁnancial
credits to continental coalitions that provided the ground forces.)
Determined to avoid a repetition of the trench warfare horrors of
1914-18, increasingly fearful of the German air threat (see discussion
below), and persuaded that France and its Eastern allies, which from
1935 on included Czechoslovakia and nominally the Soviet Union,66
would not require a major British ground force contribution in a war
with Germany, British governments in the 1930s focused increasing
defense expenditure on the Royal Air Force at the expense of the
army.67 Following Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment, however,
the Chamberlain cabinet moved quickly toward the view that a
continental commitment could no longer be avoided; even so, it was
not until February 1939 that Chamberlain ﬁnally authorized such
a commitment in the form of two divisions within 21 days of the
beginning of hostilities, with another two to follow within 65 days—
drops in the bucket compared to a fully mobilized French army and
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a rapidly expanding German army.68 (When war came in September,
the French put 84 divisions in the ﬁeld; and the Germans, 103.69)
There was, too, the problem of the Empire’s self-governing
dominions. Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand had
brought substantial resources to the British side in World War I, but
their participation in another great European war could no longer
be taken for granted. None of the dominions had any threatened
interest in such a war unless Britain itself was attacked. They certainly
had no interest in supporting a British ﬁght over Czechoslovakia;
they shared Chamberlain’s view of Hitler’s intentions in Europe
and were greatly relieved that Chamberlain had avoided war at
Munich. It was Japan, not Germany, that threatened Australia and
New Zealand; and all the dominions had a shared interest in British
defense spending that sustained the primacy of naval power, even
at the expense of Britain’s homeland air defenses. Predictably,
Chamberlain did not hesitate to cite the dominions’ European waraversity to the French as a restraint on British freedom of military
action.70 But with good reason. “It would have been as preposterous
as it was politically impossible for the dominions to have declared
in 1938 that they would throw their armed forces into a European
war,” observes Michael Graham Fry.71
France’s Strategic Dependence on Britain.
If Britain’s acute strategic overstretch counseled appeasement, it
also propelled France along the path of appeasement because the
French believed they could not act against Hitler militarily without
the British in tow. France could not hope to defeat Germany by
itself. Dependence was a function of Germany’s growing industrial
and demographic superiority over France72 and the capacity of the
Nazi regime to mobilize German nationalism to a degree which the
politically chaotic and decaying Third Republic never could rally
French nationalism. It did not help that much of British political
opinion was sympathetic to Germany’s revisions of the Versailles
Treaty’s rearmament and territorial prohibitions. Yet, as Arthur H.
Furnia points out, Versailles revisionism “permitted a rebellious
Germany to augment her growing strength . . . [and] each increase
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in German strength made France that much more dependent upon
Britain and the whims of British foreign policy.”73
A strategy of “waiting for Britain” effectively gave the British
veto power over French policy toward Germany and failed to
recognize London’s lack of appreciation of the French need for
security alliances in Eastern Europe, a region to which Britain was
not prepared to extend security guarantees until after Munich.
But the French understood that “the basic military equation in
western Europe remained a France of 40 million confronted by 75
million Germans and 40 million Italians,” an equation that dictated
“cooperation in appeasement until the policy succeeded or until the
British themselves woke up to its futility.”74
This does not excuse France for participating in the diplomatic
dismemberment of a state it was committed by treaty to defend. If
France sacriﬁced its status as a great power by adopting a purely
defensive military posture, it sacriﬁced its honor at Munich. Writing
of the Munich Conference after the war, Winston Churchill observed
that “For almost 20 years [Czech] President [Edward] Benes had
been a faithful ally and almost vassal of France, always supporting
French policies and French interests in the League of Nations and
elsewhere. If ever there was a case of solemn obligation, it was here
and now. . . . It was a portent of doom when a French government
failed to keep the word of France.”75
But for both Britain and France, more than French honor was at
stake. Czechoslovakia may not have been sustainable as a national
state over the long run, but in 1938 it was the only democracy
in Central Europe and formed a signiﬁcant strategic barrier to
German expansion into Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Indeed,
a major failure of British diplomacy during the run-up to Munich
was its almost willful disregard of Czechoslovakia’s formidable
military capabilities.76 During the Czech crisis of September 1938,
the German Army ﬁelded 37 divisions (5 of them facing France)
to Czechoslovakia’s 35 divisions (plus 5 fortress divisions).77
Moreover, the Czechs enjoyed three strategic advantages: they were
on the defensive, operated along interior lines of communication,
and possessed formidable defensive terrain and fortiﬁcations along
the German-Czech border. Czechoslovakia also had the largest
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armaments production complex in Central Europe (the Nazi takeover
of Czechoslovakia in 1939 boosted Germany’s arms production by 15
percent, and the arms and equipment of the disbanded Czech army
were sufﬁcient to ﬁt out 20 new German divisions78).
Though most historians believe that Germany could have beaten
Czechoslovakia in 1938, there is little doubt that Czechoslovakia
would have proved a much harder nut to crack in 1938 than was
Poland a year later. In his assessment of the European military
balance during the last 2 years before the war, Williamson Murray
concludes that a German campaign against Czechoslovakia in
September 1938 “would have involved signiﬁcantly higher casualties
than the campaign against Poland in 1939” because “of the nature of
the terrain, the equipment of the Czech army, Czech fortiﬁcations,
and the general state of unpreparedness of the German armored
force.”79
This was certainly the view of Germany’s military leadership,
which did not believe Germany was ready for war, had little
conﬁdence in a quick win over Czechoslovakia, and was fearful
of leaving the weakly fortiﬁed Rhineland open to possible French
attack.80 There was even discussion of a coup against Hitler on the
part of General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the Army General Staff; his
successor, General Franz Halder; and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris,
head of the Abwehr (the German military and counter-intelligence
organization), should Hitler proceed to act on his announced
decision to invade Czechoslovakia.81 Indeed, in late August 1938
the German General Staff and Foreign Ofﬁce secretly dispatched
representatives to London to warn such known anti-Hitler hardliners
as Robert Vansittart and Winston Churchill of Hitler’s plan to invade
Czechoslovakia in September.82 “The prime objective,” concludes
German historian Klaus-Jurgen Muller,
was to bring about a situation in which Hitler would be forced or frightened
into dropping war from his agenda. For this to happen evidence must be
produced that the Western powers would oppose with armed force any
further German expansion; that if war came, Germany’s allies would not
rally to the side of the Reich; that the German economy was not prepared
for war; and ﬁnally that the desired aim could be achieved without resort
to armed force.83
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One German representative declared that German Army leaders
were all opposed to war “but they will not have the power to stop it
unless they get encouragement and help from the outside.”84
Ironically, Chamberlain provided that help. In September 1938
Hitler was bent on invading and conquering all of Czechoslovakia.
At the height of the crisis, he declared to Sudeten leader Konrad
Henlein: “Long live war—even if it lasts from 2 to 8 years!”85 Hitler
wanted war because he was innately bloody-minded, because he
sought the entire Czech state (the Sudetenland issue was a pretext),
because the Czechs had embarrassed him in May by mobilizing their
forces against a falsely reported imminent German attack,86 because in
the wake of that embarrassment he had announced to his assembled
generals his unalterable intention to smash Czechoslovakia, and—
probably—because “Hitler was keen to demonstrate to his more
timid generals that he was going to be an active supreme commander.
The Czech crisis was an opportunity to challenge and test the ofﬁcer
elite, as well as the surviving conservatives in the government.”87
Hitler was well aware of the decided lack of enthusiasm among
the military leadership, Foreign Ofﬁce, and the German population
at large. (Chamberlain was wildly cheered by German crowds in
Munich as the real savior of peace in Europe.88) Mussolini was also
opposed to war, as was Herman Goering.89
The key factor in Hitler’s back-down from his threat to invade
Czechoslovakia was the possibility that the British and French
would ﬁght if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia,90 and the key
event here may have been Hitler’s meeting with Sir Horace Wilson,
Chamberlain’s personal emissary, on September 27.91 Chamberlain’s
cabinet was divided over what amounted to a German ultimatum
threatening the use of force unless Czechoslovakia accepted an
immediate German takeover of the Sudetenland; opinion was
hardening against Hitler, and it was decided to send Wilson to
Berlin with a written plea for further negotiation, and failing that,
a “special message” to be delivered orally. In “the clearest and
strongest threat made by the British government during the month
of the Munich crisis,”92 that message stated: “If Germany attacked
Czechoslovakia, France, as Daladier had informed us and as he had
stated publicly, would fulﬁll her treaty obligations. If that meant that
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the forces of France became actively engaged in hostilities against
Germany, the British Government would feel obliged to support
France.”93 Hitler rejected the written plea, and the “special message”
was then delivered. Hitler clearly understood it to be a threat of
war if he invaded Czechoslovakia, and “he clearly did not want war
with the western powers.”94 According to one of Hitler’s adjutants,
Fritz Wiedemann, Hitler told Goering: “You see, Goering, at the last
moment I thought the British ﬂeet would shoot.”95
The British historian Richard Overy has observed:
It is easy to see why Chamberlain saw Munich as victory, and Hitler saw
it as a defeat. From a position of military weakness and inferiority, with
no ﬁrm allies, and an array of diplomatic imponderables, Chamberlain
had almost single-handedly averted war between Germany and
Czechoslovakia and compelled Hitler, for the last time, to work within
the Western framework [of negotiation of territorial disputes.]96

Hitler had sought to use the “persecution” of the Germany
community in Czechoslovakia issue as a pretext for the conquest of all
of Czechoslovakia; he had not foreseen Chamberlain’s willingness to
accept the Sudetenland’s peaceful transfer to Germany. Chamberlain
had wrecked his plans. “The most disappointed man of Munich was
Adolph Hitler,” contends J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, author of an early
work on the Munich Conference. Chamberlain and Daladier “had
made so wholesale a surrender of Czechoslovakia that even Adolph
Hitler could not ﬁnd an excuse to go to war.”97 On his return to Berlin
from Munich, Hitler told Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht,
“That fellow [Chamberlain] has spoiled my entry into Prague.”98
Hitler regarded Munich as a defeat and came to regret allowing
himself to be talked and coerced out of war, and during the Polish
crisis of August 1939 was determined not to retreat from war as he
had at Munich.99 “All his actions during the Polish crisis can be
seen as a response to the defeat he felt he had suffered personally in
agreeing to pull back at the end of September 1938,” concludes Hitler
biographer Ian Kershaw.100 In 1945 Hitler told Martin Bormann:
September 1938, that was the most favorable moment, when an attack
carried the lowest risk for us. . . . Great Britain and France, surprised by
the speed of our attack, would have done nothing, all the more since we
had world opinion on our side . . . we could have settled the remaining
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territorial questions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans without fearing
intervention from the Anglo-French powers. . . . We ourselves would have
won the necessary time for our own moral and material rearmament and
a second world war, even if it was altogether unavoidable, would have
been postponed for years.101

After the war, Paul O. Schmidt, who was Hitler’s interpreter and
was constantly at Hitler’s side during the Nazi leader’s discussions
with Chamberlain, recounted Hitler’s disgust at Chamberlain’s
popularity among ordinary Germans:
Chamberlain was warmly welcomed at Munich. He was the hero of the
German people on that occasion. It was deﬁnitely Chamberlain who
was the idol of the German people in Munich—not Hitler. The German
masses gave ﬂowers to Chamberlain. One could see on their faces
that they thanked Chamberlain for saving the peace of Europe despite
Hitler.
Hitler didn’t like this show at all. He feared it would give the impression
that the German people were paciﬁsts, which, or course, would be
unpardonable in the eyes of the Nazis. Therefore, the Nazis didn’t like
this Munich show at all.102

William L. Shirer was in Berlin during the crisis and noted Berliners’
decided lack of enthusiasm for war. To stir up war fever among the
populace, Hitler ordered a motorized division to parade through the
capital, which turned into a ﬁasco. As Shirer recorded in his diary:
I went out to the corner of the Linden where the column [of troops]
was turning down the Wilhemstrasse, expecting to see a tremendous
demonstration. I pictured the scenes I had read of in 1914 when the
cheering throngs on this same street tossed ﬂowers at the marching
soldiers, and the girls ran up and kissed them. . . . But today they ducked
into subways, refused to look on, and the handful that did stood at the
curb in utter silence. . . . It has been the most striking demonstration
against war I’ve ever seen.103

As for Chamberlain and Daladier, historian Gerhard L. Weinberg
rightly stresses “the enormous signiﬁcance of the circumstances in
which military action is considered and the perceptions of such
action at the time by both by those who have to make the decision

28

and by the segments of the public that will have to bear the burdens
of any war.” In this context, he concludes, “it is surprising that in
the crisis over Czechoslovakia there was any serious consideration
of going to war at all in Britain or France.”104
A most intriguing if unanswerable question about Munich
is: what if Czechoslovakia had decided to ﬁght anyway? AngloFrench abandonment did not dictate Prague’s renunciation of the
inherent right of self-defense. The Czech military strongly favored
resistance, and Churchill believed that a Czech decision to ﬁght
would have shamed France into war.105 And who knows what might
have happened then? At a minimum, Czech resistance would have
bloodied Germany militarily and postponed Hitler’s turn on Poland
probably into the spring of 1940. Maybe his own generals would
have moved against him. Moreover, as the Soviet Union was also a
nominal treaty ally of Czechoslovakia though the two states shared
no common border, a ﬁghting Czechoslovakia, especially if joined
by France, almost certainly would have delayed, if not altogether
eliminated, the emergence of any incentive on Stalin’s part to cut the
kind of strategic deal he made with Hitler in August 1939. President
Benes’ decision not to order the defense of his own country for fear
that a vengeful Hitler would slaughter the Czech nation may have
been a more fateful one than the Anglo-French capitulation to Hitler
on the Sudetenland issue.106
Guilt Over Versailles.
Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland was Hitler’s last territorial
acquisition that could be justiﬁed on the principle of selfdetermination. Between his assumption of power in January 1933
and the conclusion of the Munich Conference in September 1938,
Hitler worked to rectify what he, all Germans, and many in Britain
regarded as injustices imposed on the German state and nation by
the vengeful victors of World War I. “Until 1938,” observes British
historian R. A. C. Parker, “British policy towards Germany was
dictated by the belief among the majority of the British public that
Germany had real grievances which should be rectiﬁed, grievances
which derived, in large part, from the alleged follies of French foreign
policy.”107
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The Treaty of Versailles was indisputably vindictive. The treaty
assigned Germany blame for World War I; imposed crushing
reparations on Germany; stripped Germany of its colonies and all
but token military power; demilitarized the Rhineland; prohibited
German union with Austria; and arbitrarily redrew Germany’s
southern and eastern borders, peeling off signiﬁcant territory and
population. As such, “it was widely regarded among historians,
economists, politicians, and policymakers as an unjust peace” and
“these guilt feelings effectively obstructed action to enforce its terms
when . . . the Third Reich started casting off the treaty restrictions.”108
This harsh and unwise diktat was imposed at gunpoint and was
unenforceable absent the constant threat of war by those who
imposed it. However, British opinion began turning against the
treaty (and against continued French belligerence toward Germany)
within months after its conclusion in 1919.
The British opposed risking war to enforce a treaty they believed
to have been a mistake in the ﬁrst place, and they believed it inevitable
that Hitler would rearm and cast off other Versailles restrictions on
Germany. Indeed, in anticipation of inevitable German rearmament,
Britain cut a naval deal with Germany in 1935 that violated the Treaty
of Versailles and gave Hitler a green light to start building a navy,
including submarines. The Anglo-German Naval Treaty, which
Hitler repudiated just 4 years later, permitted Germany to construct
tonnage up to 35 percent of that the Royal Navy. Since Germany
was starting from scratch, the agreement invited the Third Reich to
build a navy as a fast as it could. The agreement shocked the French,
who had not been consulted in advance, and encouraged Mussolini
to believe that the British were too scared of Hitler to oppose the
aggression he was about to launch in Abyssinia.109 Not until March
1939, when Hitler broke the Munich Agreement, did British and
French policy toward Germany converge on a willingness to go to
war to stop further Nazi expansion.
Dread of Strategic Bombing and Misjudgment
of the Nazi Air Threat.
Both governments and publics in Britain and France were gripped
by a generic dread of mass air attacks on cities, and governments
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misread the size and nature of the German Luftwaffe, taking at face
value Hitler’s announcement in 1935 that Germany already had air
parity with Britain.110 They saw in war with Germany immediate
and massive air attacks on London and Paris. The dread of air attack
stemmed from a belief that strategic bombardment was irresistible
and that its potential effects could include rapid disintegration of
the political and social order. In 1932 British Prime Minister Stanley
Baldwin had famously declared: “There is no power on earth that
can protect [its people] from being bombed. . . . The bombers will
always get through. The only defense is in offense, which means
that you have to kill more women and children than the enemy if
you want to save yourselves.”111 Baldwin’s view was certainly the
starting point for British and American air power advocates from
the early 1920s onward. They believed that air power, not armies
and navies, would determine the outcome of future wars, and that
the best defense against air attack was a good offense in the form of
massive bomber forces. They rejected investment in defenses which
(in the days before radar and “pursuit” aircraft that could ﬂy as fast
as bombers) they rightly regarded as futile, and they were ﬁrmly
opposed to diverting air power to assist ground and naval forces.
Until the summer of 1938, the Royal Air Force (RAF) remained
committed to deterrence of air attack via the threat of retaliatory
strategic bombardment. The persistence of this commitment was
extraordinary, given the RAF’s lack of bombers with sufﬁcient range
and payload to inﬂict more than token damage on Germany. Indeed,
the strength of the RAF’s ideological commitment to strategic bombing
stood in stark contrast to its inability to provide convincing answers
to such basic questions as what targets to bomb, how to reach them,
chances of hitting them, how hard to hit them, how to determine
damage inﬂicted, and what effect on German morale and industry?
“The RAF was, in the late 1930s,” observes air power historian
Tami Davis Biddle, “an organization facing the fact that it could not
carry out its own declaratory policy.”112 Ironically, the Chamberlain
government, on the recommendation of Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister
for the Coordination of Defense, had already decided to shift the
RAF’s funding priority from bombers to ﬁghters. Inskip believed
that German bombers could be more easily destroyed by British
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ﬁghters in British air space than by British bombers over German
airﬁelds and aircraft production sites; ﬁghters also were much
cheaper to build than bombers, and the appearance of radar would
tell Fighter Command where the attacking German bombers were.113
Over the strong objections of the RAF, the Chamberlain government
thus opted for defense over deterrence, thereby paving the way for
the 1940 Battle of Britain, perhaps the most critical defensive battle
of World War II.
The misreading of the Nazi air threat stemmed from failure to
appreciate, especially in Britain, that German air power was being
developed primarily for purposes other than strategic bombardment,
and from deliberate strategic deception by Berlin and such inﬂuential
American dupes as Charles A. Lindberg, a pro-Nazi defeatist who
trumpeted German air power’s irresistibility to British, French,
and American audiences. Because the RAF “lacked adequate
information on the purpose of the Luftwaffe . . . British air planners
assumed that its role would not be very much different from the role
they envisaged for the RAF.”114 The assumption was that Germany
would attempt a knock-out strike against London, and as early as
1934 Winston Churchill, a persistent purveyor of inﬂated estimates
of German air strength,115 argued that Germany was approaching air
parity with Britain and would have three times the RAF’s strength
by 1937.116 On the eve of Munich, Lindberg’s widely reported view
was that “Germany now has the means of destroying London, Paris,
and Praha [Prague] if she wishes to do so. England and France
together do not have enough modern planes for effective defense.”117
(On the eve of the Munich Conference British intelligence estimated
that Germany had a total of 1,963 combat-ready ﬁghters, bombers,
and dive bombers, when Germany actually ﬁelded a total of only
1,194.118) P. M. H. Bell believes that “Munich was a victory for the
terror which the Germans inspired by displaying the Luftwaffe with
panache, and letting their opponents’ nerves do the rest.”119
Germany, in fact, had nothing of the sort of air capacity
Lindberg claimed. A ﬂeet of long-range four-engine bombers lay
beyond Germany’s technical and industrial reach in the 1930s, and
strategic bombardment was, in any event, alien to the kind of war
the Germans planned to ﬁght. “Luftwaffe planners, keenly aware
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of Germany’s continental position, recognized that pursuit of an air
strategy divorced from ground operations represented a luxury the
Reich could not contemplate.”120 Accordingly, the Germans built an
air force of short-range light bombers, dive bombers, and ﬁghters
designed to support army operations; it was a force whose limitations
as an instrument of strategic bombardment were evident in the Battle
of Britain, notwithstanding the relatively short distances separating
Luftwaffe air bases in France and key targets in southern England.
Nevertheless, “the misapprehension of a Germany prepared to strike
a ‘knock-out’ blow continued right up to the war’s outbreak.”121
The French were thoroughly pessimistic over the Nazi air threat.
Though French intelligence correctly concluded that the Luftwaffe’s
primary role was to support German army operations,122 the
leadership of the French air force had no conﬁdence in its own service
in a contest with the Luftwaffe. The French air force offered Daladier
no offensive options and no convincing defensive options against a
sustained Luftwaffe assault.123 Though nominally an independent
service since 1930, the French air force was organizationally and
doctrinally tied to the methodical defensive strategy of the French
army; it had no capacity to wage a coherent air war against either
the Luftwaffe or German industry. Additionally, French aircraft
factories lacked mass production techniques and suffered chronic
labor unrest; worse still, French air planners made premature
procurement decisions that rendered much of the French air force
obsolete in 1940.124 Finally, France, like Britain, fell for Berlin’s
strategic deception on the strength of German air power. A month
before the Munich conference, General Joseph Vuillemin, chief of the
French air staff, was invited to pay the Luftwaffe an ofﬁcial visit. In
Germany he was wined and dined, taken to air bases and aircraft
production factories, and treated to “a pageant of German military
power calculated to kill any French intention to use its admittedly
weak air force, even though it was the only way that Czechoslovakia
could be given any immediate aid.”125 The visit convinced the
already pessimistic Vuillemin that the Luftwaffe could destroy the
French air force in no more than 2 weeks.126
Robert Jervis argues convincingly that Britain until 1939 was
effectively “self-deterred” from taking military action against Nazi
Germany by an exaggerated fear that “Germany would wipe out
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London at the start of a world war.” Though this fear represented a
“fundamental misreading of Germany air policy and air strength,” it
nonetheless guided British decisionmaking.127 Moreover, as Dominic
Johnson points out, an exaggerated German air threat supported the
agendas of both appeasers and anti-appeasers. “For the former it
demonstrated that war would be very costly and should therefore be
avoided; for the latter a larger Luftwaffe demonstrated that Germany
had become more aggressive and therefore that the RAF must be
built up to oppose it.”128
Public Opinion.
Not until 1939, after Hitler violently breached the Munich
Agreement with his invasion of the remainder of Czechoslovakia,
did British and French public opinion harden against Hitler to the
point where it was prepared to risk war to prevent further German
expansion. Just 6 months earlier, both Chamberlain and Daladier
had returned from Munich to cheering crowds of their respective
countrymen who were joyously relieved that war had been avoided
over Czechoslovakia.
The shift in British opinion was key because of France’s strategic
dependence on Britain and because signiﬁcant segments of the
post-World War I British and French electorates were paciﬁst
and/or committed to complete disarmament. In Britain, 4 years of
unprecedented bloodletting in Flanders followed by a vindictive
“peace” treaty convinced many that the war had been a terrible
mistake and the Versailles Treaty not much better. Thus the famous
1933 Oxford Union vote in favor of the motion: “That this House will
in no circumstances ﬁght for its King and County.” (The vote was 275
ayes to 153 nays.)129 War phobia was particularly pronounced with
respect to Germany because, as the liberal editor of the New Statesman
and Nation observed in 1929, “Almost everyone, Conservatives,
Liberals, and Labour alike, regarded the French notion of keeping
Germany permanently as a second-class power as absurd, and agreed
that the Versailles Treaty must be revised in Germany’s favor.”130
The combination of war trauma induced by the experience of 191418 and sympathy toward a Versailles-wronged Germany effectively
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precluded any British government from carrying the country into
war with Germany until Hitler clearly revealed his aggressive
intentions beyond Germanic Europe. It is improbable that even the
eloquent, Nazi-despising Churchill, had he been prime minister in
1938, could have mobilized public opinion for war with Hitler over
the fate of Germans in a mistakenly created country that Britain was
in no position to save.
The situation was not one in which British and French leaders
were imprisoned by public opinion; statesmen seek to lead rather than
simply follow public opinion—and both Chamberlain and Daladier
were experienced men in the business of government. Rather, the
situation was one in which Daladier could not hope to mobilize French
opinion for military action against Germany absent unambiguous
British support for such action, and in which Chamberlain was still
of the view that Hitler’s aims in Europe were sufﬁciently limited to
be accommodated via concession and negotiation. One could hardly
expect Chamberlain to attempt to mobilize British public opinion for
a war he believed was both unnecessary and avoidable—indeed, a
war that he almost single-handedly thwarted at Munich via the very
threat of war itself.
American Isolationism.
U.S. intervention in World War I on the side of Britain and
France sealed Germany’s military fate, and had the United States
remained politically engaged in Europe after the war, the course of
events on the Continent might have been different. France wanted
a defensive military alliance with Britain and the United States as a
deterrent to future German aggression, and had such an alliance been
established and had it remained credible (via perhaps the forward
deployment of British and American combat forces in France), it is
difﬁcult to imagine Hitler courting war with the great coalition that
had defeated Imperial Germany. Hitler, who sought to dominate the
entire continent, might have been compelled to settle for a German
empire conﬁned to Eastern Europe and Russia.
Norman Rich, in his assessment of the reasoning behind Hitler’s
fatal declaration of war on the United States following the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, contends that Hitler, though he expressed
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contempt for American military capabilities “to instill courage in
people justiﬁably fearful about America’s strength,” pursued prePearl Harbor policies toward the United States that were “determined
by a very realistic respect for American power and by a constant fear
that America might intervene in the war before Germany’s position
on the European continent had been consolidated.”131 Until the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hitler was careful not to provoke
war with an increasingly belligerent Franklin D. Roosevelt because
he was greatly impressed with America’s sheer size and capacity
for mass production.132 (His views on America’s racial composition
were another matter.)
America, of course, absented itself from Europe’s political
affairs during the Inter-War period. It took World War II and the
postwar emergence of the Soviet threat to convince most Americans
that the key to avoiding entanglement in yet another European
war was to establish peacetime military alliances with threatened
states. Roosevelt, who from the beginning had reservations about
the wisdom of Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement, grasped the
nature and severity of the Nazi threat long before he was politically
able to do much about it. By the end of 1937, he was persuaded
that the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany, Japan, and Italy
constituted a secret offensive-defensive alliance aimed at world
conquest, and though he subsequently ﬂirted with appeasement
because Chamberlain seemed committed to it, the Munich Agreement
and the bloody November 1938 Nazi anti-Jewish pogrom known as
Kristallnacht convinced Roosevelt that Hitler’s aims were unlimited
and that Nazi Germany could be stopped only by credibly threatened
force.133
Roosevelt’s freedom of action, however, was severely limited not
just by a decidedly isolationist Congress but also by Anglo-French
appeasement of Hitler. The Neutrality Act of 1937 prohibited
the United States from supplying arms or extending any loans or
credits to any belligerent in a future European war. Because the
act made no distinction between aggressor states and their victims,
it blocked Roosevelt from assisting Europe’s democracies if they
were attacked by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In so doing, it
eliminated the possibility of credible American threats to participate
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in the strategic containment of Hitler and Mussolini. It is testimony
to the isolationists’ grip on the Congress (as well as Capitol Hill’s
determination to reverse what it saw as a growing Executive Branch
accretion of power at the expense of the Legislative Branch134) that the
Senate rejected Roosevelt’s personal pleas to loosen the provisions of
the Neutrality Act until after war broke out in Europe in September
1939 and did not repeal the key provisions of the act until the eve
of Pearl Harbor. (Congress did not authorize conscription until
September 1940—after the fall of France and the Low Countries,
and amazingly, the House of Representatives voted to renew
authorization for conscription by only one vote in August 1941—2
months after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union and only 4 months
before Pearl Harbor.)
Even had the Neutrality Act been completely repealed in 1937
(the year Chamberlain became prime minister), the United States
could hardly act against Hitler when no one else in Europe would. If
public opinion in Britain and France blocked political decisionmakers
from risking war to stop Hitler until it was too late, a tradition of
isolationism from Europe’s wars and the seeming remoteness
of the German menace to America and its Western Hemispheric
security interests virtually precluded war against Germany absent a
German attack or declaration of war. C. A. MacDonald summarizes
Roosevelt’s dilemma:
It was difﬁcult to persuade [American] public opinion that an axis danger
existed while Chamberlain continued to talk about an Anglo-German
agreement. Yet Roosevelt could not persuade Britain to take a stiffer
line with Germany without widespread support for an anti-axis policy
which would convince London that American support would be quickly
forthcoming in the event of war. The President was caught between the
desire to play a larger role in world affairs and the necessity of preserving
his political position at home. He never solved the problem of balancing
these two factors. While public opinion increasingly supported an
active anti-axis policy after September 1939, it never reached the point of
endorsing American military intervention.135

Roosevelt, beginning with his famous October 1937 “Quarantine
Speech” in Chicago (which was roundly denounced by isolationists),
began a campaign to educate the American people on the gathering
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threat posed by the fascist dictators in Europe and Imperial Japan; and
beginning in 1938, he started a campaign to rearm the United States,
focusing primarily on expanded naval and air power (Roosevelt
was an air power enthusiast and believer in a potential German air
threat to the Western Hemisphere). Munich convinced Roosevelt
that Hitler could never be trusted, that his aims were unlimited, and
that Germany would eventually threaten the United States.136 From
the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 to the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Roosevelt transformed the
United States from a rigidly neutral bystander into a provider of war
assistance (Lend Lease) to Britain (and after September 1941) to the
Soviet Union and a de facto naval co-belligerent with Britain against
the German submarine menace in the North Atlantic.137
Distrust of the Soviet Union and Fear of Communism.
The alternative to appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s was formation
of the kind of grand alliance that defeated Imperial Germany in 1918
and crushed Nazi Germany in 1945. This alternative, however, was
never more than theoretical until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union
in June 1941 and declared war on the United States the following
December. For the United States, domestic politics precluded war
or military alliance with threatened states in Europe as voluntary
policy choices. But this was not the case for the Soviet Union, which
Hitler both reviled and targeted for German racial expansion. Stalin
clearly understood Nazi Germany for the deadly foe it was, and in
1934 the Soviet Union entered an alliance with France as a means
of checking German expansionism. (The alliance remained nominal
because the hostility of the French Right to the alliance effectively
blocked initiation of Franco-Soviet military staff talks.) Russia and
France had been allies against Imperial Germany, and the Soviet
Union in the 1930s constituted the only great power east of Germany.
It ﬁelded the largest standing army in Europe and possessed war
production potential second only to that of the United States. The
same logic that underlay the Anglo-French-Russian alliance of
World War I against Imperial Germany applied to stopping Hitler
from plunging Europe into another world war, and this logic should
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have been glaringly apparent after Hitler removed any doubt over
his trustworthiness and territorial intentions by invading what
remained of Czechoslovakia after Munich.
Yet in August 1939, Stalin entered a nonaggression pact with
Hitler that essentially freed German forces, once they (in conjunction
with Soviet forces) had erased Poland, to attack in the West with no
fear of having to wage war on a second front in the East. Stalin’s
conversion from a potential ally of the West into a collaborator
with Nazi Germany was the product of several factors, but primary
among them was Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler and manifest
fear of Communism and mistrust of the Soviet Union. Many Britons
and Frenchmen believed Communism posed a greater threat to the
West than Nazism, and there were in any event reasonable doubts
about the Soviet Union’s value as an ally against Hitler, especially
after Stalin decimated the Red Army’s ofﬁcer corps in 1937-38.
“It was natural for European states, especially the great imperial
powers, Britain and France, to regard Soviet communism as their
sworn enemy—for so it was,” observes P. M. H. Bell. “From this
fact of life some took the short step to the belief that the enemies
of communism were your friends, and that fascist Italy and Nazi
Germany were useful bulwarks against Soviet inﬂuence. Once this
notion took root, it was hard to accept that the Nazi regime was itself
a threat, nearer and more dangerous than the Soviet Union.”138
Hitler was also in a position to offer Stalin extensive territorial
concessions east of the Vistula River that Britain and France could
not. The nonaggression pact contained a secret protocol that
granted Stalin the eastern half of Poland, conceded to the Soviet
Union a free hand in Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, and recognized
Moscow’s interest in the Romanian province of Bessarabia. Under
the circumstances, and given the Anglo-French record of appeasing
Hitler, Stalin’s choice of a deal with Hitler rather than an alliance with
Britain and France was a no-brainer. Andrew Crozier has summed
up the array of considerations as they appeared to Moscow:
Did the Western powers really intend to resist Hitler? And, if they did,
were they capable of doing so effectively? If the answer to either of these
questions was even vaguely negative, the Soviet Union, through too
close an association with the democracies, could have found herself at
war with Germany without credible allies in the west. This would have
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been particularly embarrassing militarily for in 1939 a state of undeclared
war existed between the USSR and Japan in the Far East which might
ultimately have resulted in a debilitating war on two fronts. On the
other hand, the German offer was very attractive. It certainly meant
the postponement of war from the Soviet point of view; it implied the
possibility of being able to emerge as the tertius gaudens from a conﬂict
between the capitalist powers; and [it] allowed the extension of the
USSR’s defensive lines into Eastern Europe and the Baltic littoral. Stalin
opted for the certainties of an accommodation with Hitler, rather than
the uncertainties of a tie with Britain and France.139

* * * * *
Anglo-French appeasement of Nazi Germany during the 1930s
was the product of multiple political, military, and psychological
factors that combined to deny any realistic possibility that the
Western democracies could or would act effectively against Hitler
in time to thwart outbreak of a second world war in Europe. This is
not to embrace historical determinism; rather it is simply to argue
that the alignment of political, military, and psychological factors
in the 1930s were never such as to offer both London and Paris
simultaneously a clear appreciation of the nature and scope of the
German threat, as well as the opportunity to employ military force
conﬁdently and effectively against that threat. In hindsight, it is easy
to condemn appeasement because it led to World War II, but until
1939, the record of appeasement was one of sparing Europe from
war. Chamberlain and Daladier could not know they were making
pre-World War II decisions, on the contrary, they were struggling
to avoid war. But not at any cost. When in 1939 Hitler violated the
Munich Agreement and, in so doing, dispelled any lingering doubts
in London and Paris about his real intentions in Europe, Chamberlain
and Daladier committed to a policy of war by extending defense
guarantees to Poland and other threatened states.
WHY DID APPEASEMENT FAIL?
Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler failed for the simple reason
that Hitler was unappeasable. He wanted more, much more, than
Britain or France could or would give him. Chamberlain sought to
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propitiate Germany within the framework of Europe’s traditional
balance of power system; Hitler sought to overthrow that system.
He fooled Chamberlain (and many others in Europe, including
conservative German nationalists) into believing that Nazi Germany’s
foreign policy ambitions, like those of the Weimar Republic, were
limited to rectiﬁcation of the ‘injustices” of the Versailles Treaty,
and until 1939 he was careful to limit Germany’s explicit territorial
demands to Germanic Europe, demands he justiﬁed in the name
of national self-determination. In this regard, British policy toward
Germany was consistent from 1919 on: it sought to bring “Germany
back into the community of nations . . . negotiating the relaxation
of those [Versailles] treaty restrictions that were perceived as
untenable.” London “never supported the French policy of enforcing
the Treaty of Versailles or the French system of alliance with Eastern
Europe.”140 Needless to say, the success of Hitler’s diplomacy in the
1930s proﬁted immensely from basic Anglo-French differences over
how to deal with Germany.
To be sure, Hitler was not shy about discussing the scope of his
ambitions in Europe. Mein Kampf, written in prison 10 years before
Hitler came to power, might be dismissed as the rantings of a failed
revolutionary, but once in power, the Nazis’ innate savagery and
Chancellor Hitler’s numerous public declarations of Germany’s
racial destiny in the Slavic East—the imperative of Aryan seizure
of lebensraum in the vast domain of the inferior races that lay
between Germany and the Urals—could not be so easily ignored.
As Norman Rich notes, what Hitler had in mind as a model was
not the Hapsburgian one of “indiscriminate annexation of peoples
of different races and religions,” but rather “that of the Nordics of
North America who swept aside lesser races to ensure their own
ethnic survival.”141 But was this not a literally fantastic vision? How
would Hitler go about it? Would Eastern Europe and Russia submit?
Would the rest of Europe accept a continental German empire that
would destroy the European balance of power? Was any head of a
major European state really prepared to plunge the continent into
another bloodbath on behalf of a crackpot racial theory? It all seemed
incredible.
The very fact that Chamberlain could not bring himself to believe
that Hitler wanted another world war testiﬁed to his understanding
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that any German bid for continental domination meant war, and
in 1939 Chamberlain was even prepared to—and did—go to war
with Germany for the sake of a country Britain was in no position
to defend. Hitler, and ultimately Chamberlain, understood that his
imperial ambitions in Europe could not be satisﬁed without war.
But Hitler was not just unappeasable; he was also undeterrable.
Shows of strength and resolve—Mussolini’s reaction to Hitler’s
attempted Nazi coup in Vienna in 1934, Britain’s “special message”
of September 1938 that it was prepared to join France in going to war
over Czechoslovakia—forced Hitler to back off, but only because
Germany was still rearming and Hitler was not yet prepared to risk
military defeat or a general war. True, Hitler planned for general
war no later than 1943-45 (when he thought Germany’s military and
ideological strength would peak relative to Germany’s enemies)142
and was surprised when the French and British prematurely visited
it upon him in 1939 by honoring their defense guarantees to Poland.
But this miscalculation in no way affected pursuit of his long-term
racial objectives in the East. J. L. Richardson properly sums it up.
Given Hitler’s ideologically driven expansionism,
it follows that neither appeasement nor deterrence could have succeeded in
averting war. The fundamental reason for the failure of appeasement was
that Hitler’s goals lay far beyond the limits of reasonable accommodation
that the appeasers were prepared to contemplate. If appeasement
encouraged him to increase his demands, it was only in a short-term,
tactical sense. Likewise, if a policy of deterrence or ﬁrmness had been
adopted earlier, it would have changed Hitler’s tactical calculations, but
there is no reason to suppose that he would have modiﬁed his goals.143

War was thus inevitable as long as Hitler remained in power.
Clearly, the appeasers had illusions about Hitler; but no less clearly,
as Ernest R. May observes, “‘Anti-appeasers’ had their own illusions
which were almost equally distant from reality. They believed that
Hitler could be deterred by the threat of war. Few suspected that
Hitler wanted war.”144 The threat of war cannot be expected to scare
off a regime that welcomes war. Churchill’s postwar declaration
that World War II could have been avoided without a shot being
ﬁred was wishful thinking; it would have taken either an assassin’s
bullet or an Anglo-French preventive war to have stopped Hitler.
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Hitler’s undeterrability renders moot much discussion about
what might have been. Would, for example, a credible Franco-British
alliance with the Soviet Union have deterred Hitler from seeking to
subdue the Slavic untermensch in the East? Hitler was ideologically
predestined to invade the Soviet Union, for which he had both racial
and military contempt, and he proceeded to do so in June 1941
notwithstanding an unﬁnished and expanding war with Britain in
the West and the growing difﬁculties of his Italian ally in the Balkans
and the Mediterranean. There was, of course, virtually no prospect
of a credible Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. Most British and much
French political opinion was extremely hostile to Bolshevism and the
Soviet pariah state; an alliance with Moscow would be a pact with
the Devil. Indeed, a signiﬁcant segment of French opinion preferred
a fascist political order in France itself and viewed Nazi Germany
as an indispensable barrier to the westward spread of Bolshevism.
Russia’s military value as an ally was also questionable, especially
after Stalin’s decimation of the Red Army’s senior leadership. Nor
did the Soviet Union share a border with Germany, which meant
that Moscow could not project military power against Germany
except through Poland and Czechoslovakia.
To repeat, because Hitler was both unappeasable and undeterrable,
war could have been avoided only via Hitler’s forcible removal of
from power, an option apparently not considered by London or
Paris and only brieﬂy considered by German military leaders in
1938. Beyond Hitler’s departure from power, only a preventive war
that crippled German military power, collapsed the Nazi regime, or
both, could have averted World War II. Given the horrors of that
war, initiation of a preventive war seems retrospectively imperative,
and when neo-conservatives such as Richard Perle speak of how
Hitler could have been stopped before 1939, they mean forcible
regime change of precisely the kind the United States launched
against Iraq in 2003. For Britain and France in the 1930s, however, a
decisive preventive war against Germany was morally unacceptable,
politically impossible, and militarily infeasible. Rewriting history is
always easier than writing it.
These judgments strongly suggest that Germany without Hitler
would have been deterrable, and indeed it is hard to see how Europe
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gets to World War II without Hitler. Any German government of
the 1930s would have pursued rectiﬁcation of the Versailles Treaty
injustices, but even a government of traditional conservative
nationalists of the kind that Hitler discarded on his road to war
(precisely because they opposed his reckless policies) would have
respected the limits of German power and the unacceptability to
Britain and France of a German-dominated Europe. They would
have been happy to recover lost German territory in Poland, even to
see Poland disappear—but not at the cost of general war for which
Germany was not prepared (the German economy was not placed
on a total war footing until 1942). Almost certainly there would have
been no slaughter of the Jews.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Hitler Remains without Equal as a State Threat.
No post-1945 foreign dictatorship bears genuine comparison to
the Nazi dictatorship. The scope of Hitler’s nihilism, ambitions, and
military power posed a mortal threat to Western civilization. No other
authoritarian or totalitarian regime has managed to employ such a
powerful military instrument in such an aggressive manner to fulﬁll
such a horrendous agenda. Stalin had great military power but was
cautious and patient; he was a realist and neither lusted for war nor
discounted the strength and will of the Soviet Union’s enemies. Mao
Zedong was reckless but militarily weak. Ho Chi Minh’s ambitions
and ﬁghting power were local. And Saddam Hussein was never in a
position to reverse U.S. military domination of the Persian Gulf. Who
but Hitler was so powerful and unappeasable and undeterrable?
Anglo-French Security Choices in the 1930s
Were Neither Simple Nor Obvious.
They were at every turn severely constrained by domestic politics,
economic difﬁculties, perceptions of military inadequacy, and Hitler’s
effective strategic deception regarding Nazi Germany’s intentions
and capabilities. Appeasement of attempted German revision of the

44

Versailles Treaty made both moral and strategic sense because the
treaty was unjust, strategically short-sighted, and unenforceable.
Nor was it politically possible for the democracies to forcibly oppose
the reuniﬁcation of the German nation within a single state; the
victors of 1918 had violated Woodrow Wilson’s sacred principle of
self-determination by prohibiting union of Germany and Austria
and by creating the polyglot state of Czechoslovakia with unhappy
German minorities in that state’s border areas with Germany.
Appeasement became untenable the moment Hitler demanded,
under the threat of force, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia—
which was not only a democratic state prepared to grant the Sudeten
Germans considerable autonomy but also a signiﬁcant military
counterweight to German territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe.
Yet neither Britain nor France was in a military position to defend
Czechoslovakia, although Chamberlain’s threat of a general war
deterred Hitler from seizing all of Czechoslovakia in 1938.
Beware of Hindsight; It Is Not 20/20 Vision.
Many hindsighters believe they now know what Britain and
France (and for that matter the United States) should have done in the
1930s—regime change in Berlin via Hitler’s assassination or, failing
that, an invasion of the Third Reich—because we all know that World
War II and the Holocaust were the consequences of appeasement.
These facts were hardly self-evident at the time. Today’s should
runs afoul of yesterday’s could not and would not. British and French
statesmen did not know they were on the road to general war; on
the contrary, they were seeking to avoid it. In any case, neither
assassination of the head of a major state nor the launching of
preventive war against that state fell within the repertory of practical
and politically acceptable policy options available to London and
Paris. Past events are viewed through the lens of subsequent events.
To be sure, Neville Chamberlain profoundly misjudged Hitler, but
if Hitler had dropped dead the day after the Munich Conference
of September 1938, Munich would in all likelihood be an historical
footnote and “appeasement” a non-pejorative term.
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Invocations of the Munich Analogy to Justify Use
of Force Should Be Closely Examined.
Such invocations have more often than not been misleading
because security threats to the United States genuinely Hitlerian
in scope and nature have not been replicated since 1945. Though
the Munich analogy’s power as a tool of opinion mobilization is
undeniable, no enemy since Hitler has, in fact, possessed Nazi
Germany’s combination of military might and willingness—indeed,
eagerness—to employ it for unlimited conquest. This does not mean
the United States should withhold resort to force against lesser
threats. Nor does it mean that Hitlerian threats are a phenomenon
of the past; an al-Qaeda armed with deliverable nuclear weapons
or usable biological weapons would pose a direct and much more
lethal threat to the United States than Nazi Germany ever did.
The problem with seeing Hitler in Stalin, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi
Minh, and Saddam Hussein is that it reinforces the presidential
tendency since 1945 to overstate threats for the purpose of rallying
public and congressional opinion, and overstated threats in turn
encourage resort to force in circumstances where deterrence,
containment, even negotiation (from strength) might better serve
long-term U.S. security interests. Threats that are, in fact, limited
tend to be portrayed in Manichaean terms, thus skewing the policy
choice toward military action, a policy choice hardly constrained by
possession of global conventional military primacy and an inadequate
understanding of the limits of that primacy.
If the 1930s reveal the danger of underestimating a security threat,
the post-World War II decades contain examples of the danger of
overestimating a security threat.
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